Proof of Reckless Misguided Judges in the Appellate Court
The ORDER below from a Malicious Prosecution lawsuit proves how reckless misguided Judges in the Appellate Court are.
They were misguided by an attorney with a reckless disregard of the facts and a reckless disregard of the law and they continued his recklessness by violating the Sixth Amendment and violating the Fifth Amendment.
Judge Telleen would not allow me to reuse any exhibits from the jury trial I won unless if the person that signed them was on the witness stand. That explains why I was only allowed to move one exhibit from the trial I won into the trial for Malicious Prosecution and that was the exhibit signed by Beverly Rusk.
Given the above, when Judges at the Appellate court violated the "Confrontation Clause" in the Sixth Amendment by not letting me face Judge Brinn they concealed the fact that all the State's Witnesses were completely impeached by prior inconsistent Statements using an exhibit that Judge Brinn had signed and another exhibit that he knew about.
The fact that Judge Brinn knew about both the exhibits used to completely impeach all the State's witnesses proves a "Total Lack of Good Faith" in the prosecution. That means the result of a violation of the "Confrontation Clause" was a concealment of vital evidence in a "Malicious Prosecution" lawsuit and it was part of reason the Mack vs. First Security Bank of Chicago was "Reversed and Remanded."
The method the Judges at the Appellate Court used to make assumptions about the "Statement of Facts on the mind of" Judge Brinn that were in reality used to completely impeach all the State's witnesses was to retry a case that ended in an acquittal violating the "Rule against Double Jeopardy" in the Fifth Amendment.
But what makes it worse is even after all the State's witnesses were completely impeached by the Statement of Facts on the mind of Judge Brinn the Appellate Court went on to manipulate the completely impeached testimony to come up with a "history" and it is their manipulation of the facts they had on the transcripts in front of them that serves to prove a reckless disregard of the facts by judges violating both the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments.
To anybody that cares to take a challenge, try and find the quotes used by the Appellate Court in their ORDER below in the transcript for the jury trial. In particular is the false Statement in the ORDER below of: "find out where she could be reached."
The Trial Court Judge, Judge Telleen abused his discretion when the only part of a jury trial that I won that he would allow me to reuse in a trial for Malicious Prosecution would be a letter written by Beverly Rusk.
That letter was it. Even though Judge Telleen proved he would have accepted the word "faggot" as evidence of malice and the transcript of the jury trial proved that Beverly Rusk used the word "faggot" maliciously Duane Thompson kept objecting to me using anything from that transcript.
The facts remain:
1. A "Report of Proceedings" signed by my accuser Judge Brinn completely
impeached Cheryl Wingert with prior inconsistent statements.
http://slimefest.com/Exhibits/#Exhibit1intro
2. A Police Report that Judge Brinn was well aware of completely
impeached both Beverly Rusk and Ed Rusk with prior inconsistent statements.
http://slimefest.com/Exhibits/#Exhibit5intro
3. Defense Exhibit #4 could be used to help prove that Beverly
Rusk had been prejudiced by tainted evidence from Donny Geiger.
http://slimefest.com/Exhibits/#Exhibit4intro
4. An exhibit I planned to use if I had ever managed to pry the
word "infatuated" out of Beverly Rusk in the Malicious Prosecution lawsuit would
have helped prove that everything Beverly Rusk did to prevent me from answering her
daughter's questions was based on tainted evidence from Donny Geiger and using the
"Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" argument it means everything Beverly Rusk used the
courts for was malicious.
http://slimefest.com/Exhibits/Letters2Donny.htm
5. Given the reasons the Mack vs. First Security Bank of Chicago was "Reversed and Remanded" I should have been allowed to enter all four of the exhibits above as evidence in a "Malicious Prosecution" lawsuit because they all serve to prove the circumstances of the prosecution were inconsistent with Good Faith on the part of the Judge Brinn and a person he worked with that he called "Bev."
STATE OF ILLINOIS
3-91-0162
Wittekind v. Rusk
APPELLATE COURT THIRD DISTRICT
OTTAWA
At a term of the Appellate Court, begun and held at
Ottawa, on the 1st Day of January in the year of our Lord
one thousand nine hundred and ninety one, within and for the
Third District of Illinois:
Present -
HONORABLE ALLAN L. STOUDER, Presiding Justice X
HONORABLE JOHN A. GORMAN, Justice X
HONORABLE TOBIAS BARRY, Justice
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MC CUSKEY, Justice
HONORABLE KENT SLATER, Justice
HONORABLE HERMAN S. HAASE, Justice X
ROGER H. JOHNSON, Clerk
BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterwards on
October 16, 1991 the Order of the Court was filed
in the Clerk's Office of said Court, in the words and figures
following viz:
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No. 3-91-0162
______________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1991
ROGER T. E. WITTEKIND, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Rock Island County, Illinois
)
v. ) No. 90-SC-3806
)
BEVERLY RUSK, ) Honorable
) John M. Telleen
Defendant-Appellee ) Judge, Presiding
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
The plaintiff, Roger T. E. Wittekind, sued the defendant,
Beverly Rusk, for malicious prosecution. Following the presen-
tation of the plaintiff's case, the trial court directed a
verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.
According to the record, the plaintiff was initially tried
on charges that he had committed the offense of telephone har-
assment against the defendant (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 134,
par. 16.4-1). At trial, the defendant testified that her daugh-
ter, Cheryl Wingert, had gone to high school with the plaintiff.
The two never dated, nor had Wingert indicated any interest in
dating him. In the 17 years after their graduation, Wingert
often complained that the plaintiff had followed or telephoned
her. Consequently, the defendant asked the plaintiff to stop
calling her daughter.
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The defendant further testified that in December of 1989 the
plaintiff made repeated phone calls to her residence in an effort
to discuss her daughter and find out where she could be reached.
The defendant did not wish to discuss the matter and asked him to
stop calling. After he continued calling, she contacted the
State's Attorney's office. An office employee sent the plaintiff
a letter regarding the calls. However, on January 2, 1990,
around 4 a.m., the plaintiff again telephoned the defendant. The
defendant noted that she and her husband, Edward Rusk, work
during the day, and she found the late-night call upsetting.
Edward Rusk testified that the plaintiff had repeatedly
called them in December of 1989. Some of the phone calls were at
night. On January 2, 1990, around 4 a.m., he and his wife were
awakened by a phone call. His wife told the caller that she did
not want to talk to him and hung up.
Cheryl Wingert testified that since high school, the plain-
tiff had often followed her and sent her letters. Although she
frequently asked him to stop, he continued trying to contact her.
Two of the plaintiff's friends testified that the plaintiff
had been interested in Wingert since high school.
The plaintiff denied calling the Rusks at 4 a.m. He admit-
ted that in late December he called them during the day, but
claimed he did not intend to harass them. He also admitted
calling Wingert on January 2, 1990.
The jury acquitted the plaintiff of the charge. The plain-
tiff then sued the defendant for malicious prosecution.
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At trial, the court took judicial notice of the record of
the telephone harassment case. The defendant then testified that
she had told the police that the plaintiff had called her house
on January 2, 1990.
Edward Rusk testified that on December 13th he had spoken
with the plaintiff on the telephone. He told the plaintiff to
stop bothering them and warned him that he would go to jail. He
further testified that the plaintiff had harassed his family for
13 years and he wanted him to leave them alone in the future.
The plaintiff testified that he never intended to harass
Wingert. He then offered a letter from Don Thuline into evi-
dence, but the court denied it on the grounds of hearsay.
Following the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant
moved for a directed verdict in her favor. The trial court found
that the plaintiff had failed to prove two necessary elements of
malicious prosecution, i.e., a lack of probable cause for the
institution of the prior suit and malice on the part of the
defendant. The court therefore granted the motion for a directed
verdict.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred
in denying admission of the letter from Don Thuline. We note
that a letter is hearsay as to the truth of its contents, and is
therefore inadmissible unless it falls within one of the excep-
tions to the hearsay rule. (In re Marriaqe of Morrisroe (1987),
155 Ill. App. 3d 765, 508 N.E.2d 464.) Here, there is no indi-
cation that the letter was admissible under any hearsay
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exception. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly
excluded it.
The plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred in
directing a verdict in the defendant's favor. He contends that
he presented sufficient evidence on each of the elements of
malicious prosecution for the case to proceed to the defendant's
case-in-chief.
To establish the offense of malicious prosecution, the
plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the commencement of an
original civil or criminal proceeding by the defendant; (2) the
termination of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the
absence of probable cause for such proceedings; (4) malice on the
part of the defendant in instituting the original action; and (5)
damages to the plaintiff. (Mack v. First Security Bank (1987),
158 Ill. App. 3d 497, 511 N.E.2d 714.) For the purposes of
malicious prosecution, malice is defined as the prompting of a
prosecution for any reason other than to bring the party to
justice. (Mack, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 511 N.E.2d at 717..) A
motion for a directed verdict should be affirmed if all the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the oppo-
nent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary
verdict could ever stand. Thorne v. Elmore (1979), 79 Ill. App.
3d 333, 398 N.E.2d 837.
We note that the offense of telephone harassment occurs when
a person makes a telephone call with the intent to abuse,
threaten, or harass any person at the called number. (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1989, ch. 134, par. 16.4-1.) Given the history of the
4
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parties and the time of the phone call, we agree with the trial
court's finding that the prosecution of the plaintiff was sup-
ported by probable cause. We also agree with the finding that
the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of malice. The
record shows that the defendant dealt patiently with the plain-
tiff's frequent calls, and that she acted only out of a desire to
bring the plaintiff to justice. Accordingly, we find that the
trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the defen-
dant.
The plaintiff's other assertions are unsupported by legal
authority and irrelevant to the case on appeal. We therefore
shall not address them. See Wasleff v. Dever (1990), 194 Ill.
App. 3d 147, 550 N.E.2d 1132 (holding that arguments unsupported
by legal authority are deemed waived on review).
The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
GORMAN, J., with STOUDER, P.J., and HAASE, J., concurring.
5
The following proves how the Judges in the ORDER above violated the "Best Evidence" rule with every statement they made.
1. The Best Evidence for the decision in the Mack vs. First Security Bank of Chicago would have been the legal precedent itself because it doesn't say what Duane Thompson makes the Judges think it said, it said "Reversed and Remanded."
2. The Best Evidence for Beverly and Ed Rusk testimony was Defense Exhibit #5 because it completely impeached them with prior inconsistent statements.
3. The Best Evidence for Cheryl Wingert's testimony was Defense Exhibit #1 because it completely impeached her with prior inconsistent statements.
4. The Best Evidence for "Two of the plaintiff's friends" would have been the facts themselves on Defense Exhibit #4 instead of speculations about the facts from people that were proven not to have the facts.
5. The Best Evidence for my own testimony would have been the Exhibits themselves because Defense Exhibit #1 said Cheryl Wingert had questions and Defense Exhibit #4 said I had her answers.
Now if you throw away everything in the ORDER above that is a violation of the "Best Evidence Rule" there is nothing left to support the Judges violation of the Fifth Amendment and their violation of the Sixth Amendment when they refused to let me prove that the circumstances of the prosecution were inconsistent with Good Faith on the part of Judge Brinn and his friend "Bev."
And since there was tainted evidence from Donny Geiger involved it means that I can use the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" argument to prove everything Beverly Rusk has done to prevent me from answering her daughter's questions was malicious.
I have placed a quote from the last page of this ORDER on the Reply Brief that they obviously never looked at.